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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT: EVIDENCE OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION’S EFFECT IN NEWSPAPER
OPINION
NEAL ALLEN*
The United States Supreme Court, with its landmark racial integration
case, Brown v. Board of Education,1 stimulated a heated debate in the editorial
pages of Southern newspapers. This debate encompassed arguments not just
about the rightness or wrongness of the decision, but also included discussion
of the roles of courts, states, and law in the American constitutional system.
For example, S.F. Moody of Birmingham, Alabama wrote on June 16, 1954
about the proper application of Article V, Section 4 of the US Constitution, the
republican guarantee clause:
A state is not a republic in which the ruler or group of rulers, dedicated to rule
at will, can truly tell the subjects that the sovereignty resides in himself or the
group possessed with the powers to rule. Likewise, when the court directs
social problems and abolishes traditions in the name of law when there is no
law covering such matters, there is a complete denial of a republican form of
2
government.

Moody’s letter, arguing for a more restrained role for courts, drew a response
from Charles M. Kidd of Birmingham, who argued on June 22 that
[t]he Supreme Court of the United States is given complete power to exercise
the law in connection with our Constitution, and concerning any action which
will in the long run improve our country. . . . Could we venture so far as to say
that our republic is downfalling? Certainly not, but we could say and should
say that our republic is even strengthened by this decision abolishing
3
segregation.

This exchange is indicative of the kind of debate stimulated by the Supreme
Court with its Brown decision. This article analyzes Southern editorials and

* Neal Allen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University, neal.allen@
wichita.edu.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. S.F. Moody, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Court’s Decision Accused of Being Tyrannical,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 16, 1954, at 10.
3. Charles M. Kidd, Letter to the Editor, Nation Strengthened by Supreme Court Decision,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 22, 1954, at 14.
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letters to the editor and finds a sizable and substantively distinctive effect of
Brown on discussion of race. I find that the Court stimulated an increase in the
volume of discussion of racial issues and reoriented that discussion of race to
constitutional issues.
This article presents a theory of “judicialization” that identifies and
describes the effect of a Supreme Court opinion outside of the judicial system.
My focus is on how a decision shapes and transforms debate, instead of how
much compliance or support follows a decision. I am most directly concerned
with how, and to what extent, the Court can affect political debate, and how it
affected Southern political debate with Brown v. Board of Education, in
particular. When the Court judicializes political conflict, it reshapes it in the
form of the appellate legal process.4 Discussion in a given issue area that
previously focused on the desirability or effectiveness of a given public policy
is now also focused on issues of constitutionality. Participants in the debate,
after the judicializing decision from the high court, argue about the
constitutionality of public policy, the proper role of governing entities like
states and the federal government, and the proper theory used to interpret the
Constitution.
A decision like Brown expands the scope of constitutional argument,
involving more political actors in the process of judicial review. Appellate
courts engage in two processes: statutory interpretation and judicial review.
While statutory interpretation is concerned with whether a given piece of
legislation is being interpreted and applied correctly, judicial review is the
process of testing whether a given action of government is consistent with the
Constitution. Judicial review is concerned with the Constitution as higher law,
and what kind of legislation or execution of legislation is impermissible under
that higher law.
When individual citizens, like the Alabamians cited above, debate the
proper application of the Constitution to a particular public policy like school
segregation, they are engaged in a kind of constitutional interpretation. This
expanded judicial review debate lacks the concrete mechanism for finality that
appellate courts possess. Supreme Court justices debate over the proper
application of judicial review, and they eventually vote for one of the
competing interpretations. The issuance of an opinion or opinions brings the
discussion to a close, at least until the justices decide to begin the process
again. Debate outside the Court has no means of ending debate; discussion
continues as long as there are people interested in discussing. The only means
of achieving finality are elections, but only if those elections are contested on
the same issues as the judicialized public debate, and the elections produce a

4. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 7 (1991).
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stable governing majority of representatives who are committed to a common
constitutional and policy vision.5
A major component of this judicialized political debate, stimulated but not
controlled by a Supreme Court opinion, is the social/political doctrine. This
paper argues that when a Court opinion stimulates discussion, that discussion
often takes the form of constitutional doctrine. These doctrinal arguments are
legal in focus, but arise from core commitments of parts of society and politics.
While white Southerners responded to Brown with an alternate constitutional
vision, that vision was influenced and motivated by regional commitments to
white supremacy and institutional structures that protected white supremacy.6
Thus that doctrine was social and political, as well as legal. The arguments that
interested groups put forth in response to a Supreme Court opinion will
articulate and reveal existing social/political doctrine. This doctrine will have
the characteristics of constitutional doctrine, with theories of interpretation,
identification of sacred higher law texts, conceptions of institutional design,
and logical arguments. These doctrinal positions will support, oppose, or both
support and oppose the Court opinion.
Here it is significant not merely that in the 1950s the Court stimulated
increased opposition to school integration in the South.7 The form of argument
used by Southern defenders was legal and constitutional, opposing the
foundations of the Court’s integration arguments.8 White Southern leaders did
not merely disagree with Chief Justice Warren’s assertion that separate
institutions were inherently unequal, or that all citizens were entitled to equal
treatment from federal and state government.9 White Southerners presented a
developed alternate constitutional doctrine, still working with the Constitution
as the primary sacred text.10 Defenders of segregation added to their
interpretive theory new sacred texts, like the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions and the writings of John C. Calhoun.11 They offered a statecentered creation story to counter the Marshallian nationalist origins assumed

5. See id. at 160–62.
6. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 46–48, 60–62
(2000).
7. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 389–408 (2004).
8. POWE, supra note 6, at 60–62.
9. See id. at 58–62.
10. See id.
11. Id.; see also Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798, Nov. 14, 1799),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131–35 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987); James Madison, Virginia Resolution (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 135–36 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); JOHN C. CALHOUN, I
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (1853).
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for the Union by Warren.12 White southerners also grounded their thinking in
the concept of interposition, which was at the core of their understanding of
institutional design.13
The presentation of social/political doctrine is an important component of
the effect of a transformative Court opinion, because it allows for a kind of
communication between the Court and its adversaries, in a type of discourse
that is shaped by the arguments and institutional characteristics of the
judiciary. The presentation of arguments in a doctrinal form by Court
opponents allows for debate with groups in government and society who
support the general issue position of the Court, but for different reasons or
from different perspectives. This article makes use of newspaper opinion as a
sample and reflection of the broader debate about race stimulated by Brown,
and uses the theory of judicialization to analyze this data.
I. DATA AND METHODS
This article is an empirical examination of the Court’s indirect effect,
testing whether the judicialization model discussed above describes discussion
of race in the 1950s South. To provide data demonstrating Brown’s effect on
political debate in the South, I examine every editorial or letter to the editor
mentioning or discussing race or segregation in five Southern daily newspapers
from 1950 to 1956. I examine two large metropolitan papers, the Richmond
News-Leader and the Birmingham News. I also look at three smaller papers
published in small cities, the Bryan (TX) Eagle, the Florence (SC) Morning
News, and the Meridian (MS) Daily Star.
I argue that Brown should increase the frequency and constitutional
content of debate on Southern editorial pages, and that the debate will take the
form of an alternate constitutional doctrine to that propounded by the Supreme
Court. From my judicialization theory I derive three empirical implications, or
expectations. First, I expect that Southern newspapers will publish more
editorials and letters about race and segregation after Brown is issued than
before the decision, owing to increased attention to the issue of race once
segregation is under perceived threat. Second, I expect that more editorials and
letters to the editor concerning race will discuss constitutional issues after
Brown than before the decision, with elite and mass political actors adopting
the discourse and subject matter of constitutional interpretation. Third, I expect
that the editorials and letters to the editor, taken together, will take a doctrinal
position on race and segregation, and present constitutional arguments to
support that position.

12. POWE, supra note 6, at 58–60.
13. Id.
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The evidence found for the third expectation, involving the substantive
content of editorials and letters to the editor, is the core finding of this article.
The first two quantitative expectations, however, support the qualitative
argument in that they help to establish that judicialization is prevalent and
significant. If discussion was reshaped by the Court into a form paralleling
appellate courts, but such discussion was sparse and infrequent, then the
content of discussion would not be crucial to an understanding of Brown’s
effect. If editorials and letters making constitutional arguments made up only a
small fraction of the increase in discussion of race, then judicialization would
likewise not be very significant to a full understanding of Brown’s effect.
Findings of frequency and constitutional focus, however, are evident and
supportive of qualitative findings.
The first two expectations lend themselves to some basic descriptive
statistics, and the third (while possibly not a hypothesis, but a theoretical
proposition) requires more interpretive evidence. The data set collected from
Southern newspapers 1950–56 provides data supporting all three expectations.
Editorials and letters to the editor speak to the concerns of this inquiry, in that
they are public expressions of argumentative positions about race in the era of
Brown v. Board of Education. As arguments, they consist, with varying
degrees of logic and complexity, of propositions supported by evidence. As
arguments, they can demonstrate the importance of constitutional concerns in
discussion before and after the Supreme Court decisions.
The selection of data is not random, which limits claims about its
representativeness of Southern or American opinion in the 1950s. This
nonrandomness, however, is also an asset for this inquiry. Writers of editorials
and letters to the editor chose to express their opinions publicly, evidencing
some degree of thought about the issue of race.14 Thus these data are unlikely
to reflect what public opinion researchers call “non-attitudes”—statements that
do not reflect well-thought-out opinions, but merely on-the-spot reactions to
posed questions.15 Writers of editorials and letters in this data set are likely to

14. See TAEKU LEE, MOBILIZING PUBLIC OPINION: BLACK INSURGENCY AND RACIAL
ATTITUDES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 106 (2002). Lee makes similar use of nonrandom data to
analyze historical public opinion. He uses letters to the president as a proxy for informed public
opinion, sampling one of every twenty letters from 1948–65. He argues that this data is more
indicative of public opinion than survey responses, since letter data is created by individuals who
have thought about an issue and formed an opinion, instead of being created by an interaction
between an individual and a survey. The kind of effects that are the subject of my qualitative
analysis would not be evident in a survey, but are evident in editorials and letters sent to
newspapers.
15. JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & PUBLIC
CONSULTATION 3–4 (2009).
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have been active and thoughtful participants in a national and regional
conversation, and likely to shape discussion about race and segregation.16
I focus on debate in the South for both theoretical and practical reasons.
While the eleven former Confederate states were not the only states operating
segregated school systems, the South was home to the largest concentration of
blacks in America, and to the most entrenched and pervasive form of racial
segregation.17 Thus reaction to Brown was most pronounced in Southern states,
even though only one of the five desegregation cases decided on May 17, 1954
was from a Southern state.18 Brown was regarded as a direct challenge to
regional customs, traditions, and ways of life, and thus provoked a massive
reaction.19 Focusing on the South allows me to examine reaction to the
Supreme Court’s decision in a relatively unfiltered form, since white Southern
opposition to integration became dominant in many Southern states before
other important events involving integration, like the 1957 integration of Little
Rock High School in Arkansas and the protest movements of the 1960s.20
Also, focusing mainly on Southern reactions allows me to assemble a data set
of five newspapers from different parts of the South, making my sample a
more representative regional sample, instead of having one Southern paper in a
larger national data set.
The five-newspaper data set is representative of the 1950s South in several
important ways. While all five papers are dailies, the Richmond and
Birmingham are major metropolitan dailies, while the Florence, Meridian, and
Bryan papers are small city dailies. Having data from large and small papers
captures both metropolitan and rural opinion. Small city papers are the best
approximation of a rural paper for this inquiry, since most small-town papers
are weekly and would not provide enough data and also may not be available
on microfilm. The five papers are also differentiated by subregion, with
Birmingham, Alabama, Meridian, Mississippi, and Florence, South Carolina in
the Deep South, and Richmond, Virginia and Bryan, Texas in the Peripheral
South.
The states served by the five papers examined here also differ in their
immediate connection to the Supreme Court decision in 1954. Clarendon
County, South Carolina was the origin of Briggs v. Elliott, one of Brown’s
companion cases.21 School districts in Virginia and Texas were the subject of

16. See LEE, supra note 14, at 106.
17. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 128 (3d ed. 1974).
18. KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 292.
19. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S, at 67 (1969).
20. See KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 390–91.
21. Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
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desegregation orders issued by federal judges in 1956.22 Court-ordered
integration did not come to Alabama and Mississippi for over a decade after
Brown and Brown II, the 1955 implementation decision.23 The data set
includes one paper, the Richmond News-Leader, which was a regional and
national leader in forming a counterargument to the Court on integration.24
Thus many letters are written in response to editorials in that paper about
integration, and are therefore once-removed from Brown in the causal chain.
The Richmond paper provides the strongest example of the judicialized debate,
but the other four papers provide corroborating evidence.25 All these important
differences among the five chosen newspapers make the data set as
representative as possible, considering the labor required to sort through six
and a half years of each newspaper, a period encompassing over 2,000 days of
coverage.26
I chose the period from June 1, 1950 to November 31, 1956 for reasons of
substance and practicality. The foremost advantage of studying newspaper
opinion in that time period is that Brown occurs in the middle of it, on May 17,
1954.27 Thus I can track change in response to Supreme Court action. Also
Brown is the only major Supreme Court decision on race in the period,28
although there is some discussion of the 1950 Sweatt v. Painter decision,
which ordered that state law schools be integrated, in the beginning of the
period.29 Also, the Little Rock crisis of 1957 is outside of the scope of the data
set, as are all major direct action protest events except for the Montgomery bus
boycott of 1955. The regional and temporal features of the five-newspaper data
set allow for a focus on Brown as the event that caused increases in, and
transformation of, the discussion of race.
I constructed this data set with a two-step sorting process. First I collected
every editorial or letter to the editor that discussed race. An opinion piece was
classified as discussing race if it used the words “Negro” or “colored,” or if it
referred specifically to a particular race or ethnicity, or to racial minorities.

22. KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 414.
23. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 50–54.
24. POWE, supra note 6, at 58–60; KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 395, 417.
25. See infra Table 1.
26. The number of days of editorial opinion examined differs slightly from paper to paper,
since some did not publish on Sunday, or did not have an editorial page on Sunday. Also some
papers did not publish on certain holidays. The data set also does not include opinion from
February 1–15, 1953 of the Richmond News-Leader, due to a missing reel in the microfilm
collection of the Center for Research Libraries.
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. The only Supreme Court cases that are frequently discussed in the newspaper opinion
under review here are the cases that became the Brown decision, in particular Briggs v. Elliott in
South Carolina. See Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
29. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Explicit discussion of “civil rights” qualified as race discussion, as did any
explicit or implicit mention of segregation or integration. Pieces using terms
like “FEPC,” the acronym for the Fair Employment Practices Commission,
were included if in context the writer was referring to the FEPC in its dealings
with racial discrimination, since that federal agency dealt with other kinds of
discrimination. Mentions of “the Supreme Court’s recent decision” were only
classified as discussion of race if the context made clear that the decision
discussed was Brown or another race relations decision. This sorting collected
648 editorials and 791 letters, taken from over 10,000 daily editions of the five
newspapers. Table 1 lists the breakdown of editorials and letters by
newspaper.30 All papers usually published several editorials, although the
Richmond and Bryan papers occasionally published only one. The Bryan and
Florence papers published letters so infrequently that they do not provide data
useful for this analysis. The Meridian paper normally printed one letter to the
editor, and the Richmond and Birmingham papers, most days, printed several,
with Richmond occasionally printing more than a dozen.
I then coded the observations for the presence of one or more of four
frames: constitutional, economic, religious, and Cold War. Many scholars,
notably Gamson, have discussed the importance of frames as conceptual
structures that condition the presentation and reception of information and
argument.31 I argue that the Supreme Court discussed race using a
constitutional frame, and Southerners responded with arguments presented
through a constitutional frame. Editorials and letters also show use of other
frames as well, although they are not as prevalent as the constitutional frame.
An opinion piece was coded as constitutional, or as using a constitutional
frame, if it discussed one of the following issues or topics: the Supreme Court
or other courts, the constitutionality of government actions, interpreting the
Constitution, the structure of the political system, or the relationship between
political institutions like states and the federal government. A piece was coded
as using an economic frame if it discussed the national or local economy,
employment, economic prosperity or growth, or the connection between race
and economics. A piece was coded as religious if it discussed race with
reference to Christianity or another religion, supported an argument with
reference to religious authority, or if the writer used phrases like “God help us”
or “Almighty God” when discussing racial issues. A piece was coded as using
a Cold War frame if the writer linked racial issues to the Soviet Union,
communism, or socialism. Some editorials and letters used more than one
frame, and were coded as such.

30. See infra Table 1.
31. WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS 4–7 (1992).
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II. FINDINGS
Concerning frequency, my theory generates an expectation that there will
be more editorials and letters to the editor that discuss race after Brown than
before the decision. Analysis of the newspaper data follows the expected
pattern. Table 2 presents the frequency of editorials before and after May of
1954.32 The five newspapers published 4.5 editorials per month before the
decision, and 13.9 per month after, more than tripling after May of 1954.33
Since the Richmond News-Leader devoted such a large part of its editorial
pages to presentation of the constitutional argument against integration,
devoting the entire editorial page to the theory of “interposition” for months in
late 1955 and early 1956, I also analyzed the editorial data without the Virginia
paper.34 Table 3 presents those results, showing an increase from 3.4 editorials
per month before the decision to 9.5 per month after, nearly the same
percentage increase as the full sample.35 Table 1 shows the number of
editorials by year, with years designated in distance from May of 1954.36 The
fifth year, beginning with the month of the Supreme Court decision, shows the
sharpest increase in discussion.37
Letters to the editor that discuss race also increase in number after Brown,
and the increase is much larger than that observed in editorials.38 Table 4
shows these results, with an increase from 2.2 letters per month before the
decision to 22.0 per month after,39 and Table 2 shows the increase in editorials
32. See infra Table 2. For purposes of quantitative analysis, the entire month of May 1954 is
counted as after the Supreme Court decision, even though it was handed down on the 17th and
reported in newspapers on the 18th. When the data are analyzed by year, the years used begin
with May of the calendar year. If considering the entire month of May 1954 as after the decision
would have any affect on the findings of this paper, it would be to slightly reduce the observed
impact of Brown. Since May 1–17 is such a small part of the time studied, any effect on analysis
is minimal or nonexistent.
33. See infra Table 2.
34. See Frances L. Baer, Resistance to Public School Desegregation Arkansas, Little Rock,
and Beyond, in LAW & SOCIETY RECENT SCHOLARSHIP 61, 61–80 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2008).
35. See infra Table 3.
36. See infra Table 1.
37. See infra Table 1 and Table 2. Both Table 1, showing frequency of editorials, and Table
2, showing frequency of letters, show the highest frequency in 1955 and 1956, not in 1954. This
might be a result of a lagged effect of Brown, or an effect of Brown II, in June 1955. Two events,
however, may explain the lagged increase. Discussion of race in Birmingham spiked in response
to the attempt of a black student, Autherine Lucy, to enter the University of Alabama. See
generally DR. JACK KUSHNER, COURAGEOUS JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN ALABAMA 75 (2011). In
Virginia, discussion of race increased surrounding a special session of the state legislature, and
letters increased in response to a series of editorials, discussed below, that attempted to influence
that special session. See generally BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA’S MASSIVE RESISTANCE 24–38
(1961). Both these events, however, were to a great extent results of Brown.
38. See infra Table 4.
39. See infra Table 4.
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by month.40 This tenfold increase is much larger than the threefold increase
observed in editorials. The difference might be due to the fact that newspaper
editorial writers, as members of the Southern elite, were likely aware of the
potential threats to segregation, from both courts and non-Southerners in the
legislative and executive branches. Thus editorial writers began the 1950s with
a substantial interest in racial issues, with Brown contributing to an increased
focus in the middle of the decade. The decision was a greater shock to the mass
of Southern whites, who could no longer count on their elected leaders to
prevent a challenge to segregation coming from the national government.41
I also analyzed the letter to the editor data without the Richmond NewsLeader, which provided over two-thirds of the letters.42 Table 5 presents those
results. The sample with Richmond removed, which is mostly Birmingham
letters, showed an increase from .69 letters per month before Brown to 5.9
letters per month after the decision.43 The increase was similar, but slightly
smaller in percentage terms, than that observed in the full sample.44
My second empirical expectation derived from my judicialization theory is
that a larger percentage of editorials and letters to the editor will present
constitutional arguments, or utilize constitutional frames, after the decision
than before. To capture such an increase I calculate the percentage of editorials
that are coded as constitutional for each year studied. I designate year periods
from May of 1954 in order to capture the effect of Brown. Table 6 presents the
results of this analysis, showing that in the fifth year studied constitutional
editorials jumped from 19% to 45% of total editorials discussing race.45 Table
7 presents a more focused analysis, with 23% of editorials before Brown
making constitutional arguments, and 47% making constitutional arguments

40. See infra Table 2.
41. I must make one caveat to my treatment of letters to the editor as data indicative of
Southern mass opinion in the 1950s. These letters are a clearly nonrandom sample not just
because the writer had to decide to submit a letter, but also because a newspaper editor had to
decide to print the letter. I have no way of knowing how many letters sent to the five newspapers
in my sample were not printed, or whether the unprinted letters differ in substantively important
ways from the printed letters. The printed letters, however, are from both supporters and
opponents of the Supreme Court; some make constitutional arguments, some do not. This
diversity leads me to infer that editors were not excluding certain letters based on the argument of
writers. Also the quantitative and qualitative findings of this article are robust enough to be valid
even if there was some substantive filtration of letters. I am using the letter and editorial data to
advance a particular empirical interpretation of Brown’s effect, not to paint an exactly
representative picture of Southern public opinion in the 1950s.
42. See infra Table 5.
43. See infra Table 5.
44. Compare infra Table 5, with infra Table 4.
45. See infra Table 6.
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after.46 Table 8 presents the same analysis with data from the Richmond NewsLeader removed, with a greater percentage increase, from 10% to 33%.47
Letters to the editor show a parallel increase in the proportion of
constitutional argumentation after Brown. Table 9 shows the percentage of
constitutional letters by year, with years after May 1954 showing a higher
percentage of letters making constitutional arguments.48 Table 10 shows that
before Brown, letters making constitutional arguments constituted 21% of the
total, and after the decision were 55% of the total.49 Table 11 presents results
for the sample without Richmond letters, showing an increase from 3% to
41%.50
If Brown had the judicializing effect that I claim here, the constitutional
frame should be more prevalent than other frames after the decision. Tables 12
and 13 show such a relationship, with use of constitutional frames
outnumbering use of the other three frames after May of 1954.51 The only
other frame that is significantly more common after the decision is the
religious frame in the letters sample.52 While the constitutional frame is nearly
three times as prevalent, the religious frame is used in 127 out of 683 letters
after Brown.53 Much of this use of religious frames comes from the argument
that segregation is ordained by God, a particular religious argument not often
found in editorials. Such religious argument would likely be made by letter
writers in response to any threat to segregation, not just one coming from the
Supreme Court.
Quantitative analysis of newspaper opinion demonstrates that discussion of
race increased sharply after Brown, and that discussion was often carried on
using constitutional argument.54 The most interesting finding of this article,
however, comes from textual analysis of editorials and letters to the editor. I
find that the arguments made in response to Brown constitute an ongoing
dialogue about the nature of the American constitutional system and
demonstrate how the Supreme Court stimulated nonjudicial actors to engage in
constitutional argument.
The best and most coherent example of judicialized argument, and in
particular social/political doctrine, is the editorial campaign waged on the
editorial pages of the Richmond News-Leader in late 1955 and early 1956.
Within the conflict over integration that later played out in elections and street
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 10.
See infra Table 11.
See infra Table 12 and Table 13.
See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 1.
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protests, white Southerners constructed an alternate constitutional vision.55
Written by James J. Kilpatrick, these writings were an explicit attempt to give
legal and constitutional form to the reactionary movement of the White
South.56 Powe identifies the editorials as key documents in the development of
the Southern resistance. “The political and intellectual problem facing the
South was how to explain to itself and the rest of the nation why defying the
Supreme Court of the United States was okay.”57
The News-Leader editorials present a constitutional interpretation
constructed around the concept of interposition, in which a state “interposes”
itself between its citizens and an unjust federal government action.58 Thus,
resistance to the Supreme Court decision was not unlawful, but “the highest
possible example of fidelity to the compact.”59 According to Kilpatrick’s
understanding, the moral and legal high ground is occupied by Southern
Whites, with their “reverence for law, and our obedience to constituted
authority.”60 This states’ rights-centered theory was justified with reference not
just to the nature of the ratification of the Constitution, but to other documents
like Jefferson and Madison’s Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and the
writings of Calhoun. The Southern federalist theory is argued against the
Court’s nationalism; individual rights are confronted by sovereign power.
These editorials follow the form of what I call the production of
social/political doctrine. Previously existing regional values are publicly
presented as a coherent doctrine that is grounded in legal and historical
authority. An interpretation of the Constitution is supplemented by the
inclusion of supportive sacred texts into the constitutional canon. A revised
founding narrative is offered as the foundation for opposition to the Court’s
argument and directives. Thus the Court stimulates an intellectual process that
replicates its own process, but using different inputs and ideas.
Not only do the arguments of the Richmond paper’s Kilpatrick editorials
follow the form of social/political doctrine, they were published in a form
clearly meant to be taken as constitutional doctrine. The News Leader
published them in a pamphlet called Interposition, and included supporting
materials like the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and writings by states’
rights proponents like Calhoun, John Taylor of Caroline, and Littleton Waller
Tazewell, governor of South Carolina in the 1830s.61 These sacred texts were

55. Baer, supra note 34.
56. See JAMES J. KILPATRICK, INTERPOSITION: EDITORIALS AND EDITORIAL PAGE
PRESENTATIONS, THE RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, 1955–1956 (1956).
57. POWE, supra note 6, at 58.
58. Id.
59. See KILPATRICK, supra note 56 (originally printed Nov. 23, 1955).
60. Id (originally printed Nov. 22, 1955).
61. Id.
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included along with resolutions and reports of the Virginia legislature in
support of massive resistance to integration.62 This pamphlet includes all the
components of a social/political doctrine and was produced in opposition to
Brown and to support the movement against the Court’s position.63
In 1962, Kilpatrick wrote an extended book version of the argument
presented in his 1955–56 editorials, called The Southern Case for School
Segregation.64 In the introduction, he framed his project as the production of
constitutional doctrine.65
May it please the court:
When this book was conceived, it was intended to be titled “U.S. v. the South:
A Brief for the Defense,” but it seemed a cumbersome title and the finished
work is not, of course, a brief for the South in any lawyer’s sense of the word.
It is no more than an extended personal essay, presented in this form because
the relationship that exists between the rest of the country and the South, in the
area of race relations, often has the aspect of an adversary proceeding. We of
the South see ourselves on the defensive, and we frequently find ourselves, as
66
lawyers do, responding in terms of the law and the evidence.

This project, however, was not exclusively pursued by one newspaper over a
few months, but by different newspapers and hundreds of letter writers across
the South. Analysis of the five-newspaper data set finds that discussion of race
shifted to a constitutional focus in the mid-1950s, and this shift was a result of
Brown v. Board of Education.67
Before moving to a discussion of post-Brown judicialized dialogue, it is
important to examine dialogue before the Supreme Court decision. Race in
general, and segregation in particular, were often discussed as public policy
before the decision, and not in terms of constitutionality. An illustrative
example is this passage, from the editorial “Crime and the Deep South, III”
from the Richmond News-Leader on May 1, 1953, discussing the relationship
between high murder rates and large black populations in Southern cities:
The level of morality and respect for law indicated by these figures constitutes
one of the principal reasons advanced by the South in defense of its historic
public policy of racial segregation, though for some reason it is difficult to get
our critics to recognize the facts. But these demonstrably high crime rates
constitute more than that. They represent an economic loss and a social evil of

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
JAMES J. KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION 6−7 (1962).
Id.
Id.
See infra Table 11.
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the first magnitude and they justify thoughtful study by leaders of both races to
68
determine how the picture may be improved.

Segregation is discussed as a desirable governmental policy and resulting in
reduction of crime.69 Argument about race does not here involve a vision of the
constitutional system.70
An editorial from the Bryan (TX) Eagle, titled “Public Housing,”
published June 21, 1951, gives another example of discussion of race in terms
of policy, not constitutionality:
In the opinion of citizens of Bryan who are generally familiar with conditions
the need for such a project is greater than it was a decade or more ago. In that
period there has been a heavy influx of Mexicans and many of these families
are in deplorable condition from the point of housing. Many Negro families are
71
in no better condition.

This editorial, the only one in the data set discussing a minority group other
than blacks, is concerned with segregation as public policy.72 It advocates the
expansion of public housing, and argues this expansion should occur within the
framework of segregation.73 A lengthy example of pre-Brown argument on
race comes from an editorial published July 19, 1951 in the Florence (SC)
Morning News, under the title “The North Could Profit by Studying Methods
of the South in Handling of Race Riots.”74
The South has never had a race riot equivalent to the one staged in Cicero,
a suburb of Chicago, not even during the bitter Reconstruction days.
It should stop the mouths of the Northern agitators who like to give the
impression that the South is the only section of the nation where relations
between the races is not what is ought to be. . . . [W]e [the South] recognize
the problem for what it is and set up conditions in which the two races can live
75
side by side peaceably and profitably.

This defense of segregation is made on policy grounds, not grounds of
constitutionality or in terms of the proper organization of the political system.76
Nonconstitutional, policy-focused arguments about race also were
prevalent in letters to the editor before Brown. A letter signed “Meridian Home
Owner” published December 19, 1950 in the Meridian (MS) Star calls for

68. Crime in the Deep South, III, RICHMOND NEWS-LEADER, May 1, 1953, at 10.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Public Housing, BRYAN DAILY EAGLE, June 21, 1951, at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. John M. O’Dowd, The North Could Profit By Studying Methods Of The South In
Handling Of Race Problem, FLORENCE MORNING NEWS, July 19, 1951, at 4.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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more available housing for black citizens, arguing in terms of segregationist
policy, not constitutionality:
Southern Negroes are not clamoring for anti-segregation. They want homes
where they can have peace, quiet, sanitary surroundings, where they can rear
their children properly and enjoy the friendship and companionship of their
own kind. They want to become first-class, taxpaying, home-owning citizens.
77
They are part and parcel of the community.

Such support for segregationist public policy was also evident in a letter from
Henry L. Jones of Birmingham, Alabama, published in the Birmingham News
under the title of “Another Negro Park, or Improve Present One,” on August
31, 1952: “There is no reason why the city cannot at least have a properly
equipped park. There are a lot of places smaller than Birmingham which try to
show that they are interested in their Negro population also.”78 This focus on
policy, not constitutionality, was characteristic of discussion of race in the preBrown period.
The shock to the Southern social and political system that came from the
high court in May of 1954 shifted the focus of Southern race debate to one of
constitutionality.79 Segregation was still defended as desirable and effective
public policy, but now the constitutional frame was most evident. Some of this
constitutional argument concerned the practical questions raised by the Brown
decision. The Birmingham News discussed issues of implementation in an
editorial published on December 13, 1954, titled “Alabama Communities Vary
Widely as to School Segregation Problem.”
Alabama in some respects has the gravest problem of all the states in regard to
carrying out the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that segregation should be
abolished in public schools. No other state has a wider range in the proportions
of the races which live in various counties. . . . [T]he school problems growing
out of the court’s de-segregation decision can best be regarded as local with
methods and timing in dealing with the situation having regard for the make-up
of population. The situation surely is one that the Supreme Court recognizes
80
and will consider in making its order of last May 17 effective.

Many other editorials and letters engaged in discussion of the direct effect of
the Court’s ruling.
Others, particularly the Richmond News-Leader, presented highly
theoretical and historically grounded arguments for action that would preserve
a “states’ rights” version of the constitutional system, a system which many

77. Letter to the Editor, Meridian Home Owner, MERIDIAN STAR, Dec. 19, 1950, at 4.
78. Henry L. Jones, Letter to the Editor, Another Negro Park or Improve Present One,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 31, 1952, at C2.
79. See infra Table 13.
80. Editorial, Alabama Communities Vary Widely as to School Segregation Problem,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 13, 1954, at C2.
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white Southerners believed was ordained by the Founding and the
Constitution.81 The doctrine of interposition was also supported by other
Southern newspapers. The Florence Morning News argued on January 8, 1956:
There is a serious question in the minds of the Southern states as to whether or
not the Supreme Court exceeded the rights and authority given it in the
Constitution. Since the purity of the Constitution is at the heart of the test,
Interposition would be an act to strengthen the Constitution. It would not
challenge the Constitution.
Recognizing the right of the States to challenge a questionable act places the
burden of proof properly on the shoulders of the Federal Government. It must
win support for its position by making the Court’s decree an acceptable
amendment to the Constitution. The result, then, will bind all or none. As John
Milton asked in a famous discussion of freedom, “What can be juster in a state
82
than this?”

The prevalence of constitutional argument extended to facets of the debate
over race outside of court-ordered integration. The Meridian (MS) Star
editorialized on December 15, 1955 that “[u]nder the Constitution, the States
are reserved the rights of operating their educational systems. As far as we can
see, there is nothing in the Constitution to give the federal government any
authority to operate schools in any state in the nation.”83 President Dwight
Eisenhower’s school funding program was opposed on constitutional
grounds.84 The Mississippi newspaper argued that such federal aid to schools
was an impermissible alteration of the constitutional system, violative of the
Constitution as higher law.85
Letter writers also opposed integration on constitutional grounds during the
period of judicialized debate that followed Brown. L.N. Formby of Picayune,
Mississippi, writing in the Meridian (MS) Star June 12, 1956, argued that to
win Southern votes, the Democratic Party should embrace a platform that
supports
the fight for States’ rights, including the right of every State to control and
segregate its schools . . . [and] the right to maintain a Constitution and laws
against sedition, treason and subversive acts to overthrow the State
Government, and to maintain Constitutional provisions and laws for suitable
86
police power within the state.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

BARTLEY, supra note 19, at 67.
Editorial, FLORENCE MORNING NEWS, Jan 8, 1956, at 4.
Editorial, Federal School Aid, MERIDIAN STAR, Dec. 15, 1955, at 4.
Id.
Id.
L.N. Formby Sr., Editorial, Star Reader Editorial, MERIDIAN STAR, June 12, 1956, at 4.
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Mrs. R.R. Johnson of Blackstone, Virginia argued on June 10, 1955 that the
Supreme Court exceeded its rightful power under the constitution, and that
judges should lose their life tenure:
When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion that segregation in public
schools was unconstitutional it exercised the limit of authority granted it by the
supreme law of the land, the Constitution of the United States. . . . If the
Constitution is no more stable than are the minds of the present members of the
Supreme Court, then God help us! That document should be re-written and
make its members, as are the President and members of Congress, subject to
87
election by the people.

Mrs. Johnson’s constitutional critique, while not terribly sophisticated, is part
of a broader phenomenon brought about by Supreme Court action.
Constitutional argumentation, coming from both mass and elite actors,
followed from the Court’s desegregation decisions of 1954 and 1955.
Taken together, these instances of constitutional argumentation constitute
the production and presentation of Southern white social/political doctrine.
That doctrine was not created by the Supreme Court; it was at times evident in
editorials before May of 1954, and certainly had roots in the Founding and
Civil War. But the Court’s challenge to Southern social institutions and
customs motivated the defenders of segregation to argue publicly in defense of
their social system, and to make that argument in constitutional terms.
Southern editorialists and writers of letters became advocates of a particular
theory of constitutionality, and they advocated their position in the public
forum of newspaper editorial pages.
This greater focus on constitutionality and the increased frequency of
discussion of race are, at minimum, strongly associated and correlated with
Brown. I argue that the timing and substantive orientation of this quantitative
and qualitative shift in the Southern discussion of race support the claim that
Brown caused the transformation. The decision had an effect outside of the
judicial system, and that affect took the form of judicialization, with the Court
remaking political conflict in a manner consistent with its institutional identity
as a Court.

87. R. R. Johnson, Editorial, High Court Judges Should Be Elected, RICHMOND NEWSLEADER, June 10, 1955, at 18.
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Table 1: Editorials and Letters to the Editor by Newspaper

Richmond News-Leader
Birmingham News
Florence(SC) Morning News
Meridian (MS) Star
Bryan (TX) Eagle
Total

Number of Race
Editorials, 1950-56
188
105
250
72
33
648

Number of Race
Letters, 1950-56
572
210
n/a
8
n/a
791

Table 2: Frequency of editorials, before and after Brown

# per month Before Brown
(49 Months)
# per month After Brown
(31 Months)

Total Editorials
218

Editorials
per month
4.5

430

13.9

Table 3: Frequency of editorials, before and after Brown, without Richmond
News-Leader

# per month Before Brown
(49 Months)
# per month After Brown
(31 Months)

Total Editorials
165

Editorials
Per Month
3.4

295

9.5

Table 4: Frequency of letters to the editor, before and after Brown

# per month Before Brown
(49 Months)
# per month After Brown
(31 Months)

Total Letters

Letters
Per Month

107

2.2

683

22.0
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Table 5: Frequency of letters to the editor, before and after Brown, without
Richmond News-Leader

# per month Before Brown
(49 Months)
# per month After Brown
(31 Months)

Total Letters
34

Letters
per month
.69

184

5.9

Table 6: Race Editorials Using Constitutional Frame by Year
Year
June 1950 –
April 1951
May 1951 –
April 1952
May 1952 –
April 1953
May 1953 –
April 1954
May 1954 –
April 1955
May 1955 –
April 1956
May 1956 –
Nov 1956
Total

Const.
26

Total
69

% Const.
38%

12

57

22%

2

38

5%

10

52

19%

47

105

45%

93

189

49%

63

136

46%

253

648

39%

Table 7: Percent of Editorials that use Constitutional Frame, before and after
Brown

Before Brown
After Brown

Constitutional
Editorials
50
203

Total Editorials
218
430

Percent
Constitutional
23%
47%

Table 8: Percent of Editorials that use Constitutional Frame, before and after
Brown, without Richmond News-Leader

Before Brown
After Brown

Constitutional
Editorials
17
96

Total Editorials
165
295

Percent
Constitutional
10%
33%
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Table 9: Race Letters to the Editor Using Constitutional Frame by Year
Year
June 1950 –
April 1951
May 1951 –
April 1952
May 1952 –
April 1953
May 1953 –
April 1954
May 1954 –
April 1955
May 1955 –
April 1956
May 1956 –
Nov 1956
Total

Const.

Total

% Const.

1

21

5%

4

24

2%

5

17

29%

13

32

41%

100

173

58%

215

381

56%

63

129

49%

401

790

51%

Note: The first year contains only 11 months, and the last year only seven
months
Table 10: Percent of Letters that use Constitutional Frame, before and after
Brown

Before Brown
After Brown

Constitutional
Editorials
23
378

Total Editorials
107
683

Percent
Constitutional
21%
55%

Table 11: Percent of Letters that use Constitutional Frame, before and after
Brown, without Richmond News-Leader

Before Brown
After Brown

Constitutional
Letters
1
76

Total Letters
34
184

Percent
Constitutional
3%
41%

Table 12: Number of Editorials that use Constitutional Frames, Compared to
Other Frames
Before Brown
After Brown

Constitutional
50
203

Economic
12
14

Religious
4
7

Cold War
5
8
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Table 13: Number of Letters to the Editor that use Constitutional Frames,
Compared to Other Frames
Before Brown
After Brown

Constitutional
23
378

Economic
9
10

Religious
14
127

Cold War
4
38
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